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459 
QURAN BURNING AND RELIGIOUS HATRED:  
A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN, 
INTERNATIONAL, AND EUROPEAN 
APPROACHES TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
In July 2010, a pastor in Florida threatened to organize a mass burning 
of Qurans on September 11, 2010, the ninth anniversary of the 9/11 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by commercial planes 
hijacked by members of Muslim extremist group Al Qaeda.
1
 Though 
religious and political leaders objected strenuously to his plans and 
stressed that Jones did not speak for America, violent protests erupted in 
Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, and elsewhere causing numerous injuries.
2
 
International leaders from the United States‘ closest allies called on 
President Obama to stop him.
3
  
 
 
 1. Ann Gerhart & Ernesto Londoño, Fla. Pastor’s Koran-Burning Threat Started with a Tweet, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2010, at A6 (recounting from the beginning the story of Pastor Terry Jones‘s 
threats to hold ―Burn a Quran Day,‖ and the national and international dialogue that followed, 
resulting in Pastor Jones‘s cancellation of the event prior to September 11).  
 2. Id.; see also Aijaz Hussain, 15 Dead as Kashmir Tries to Quell Protests; Koran-Burning 
Fuels Anger in Troubled Region, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2010, at 6 (reporting violent protests 
sparked by Iranian state television broadcasts of Qurans being burned in the United States). As 
Hussain articulated:  
Violent antigovernment protests first erupted in June. While separatists had planned a new 
round of demonstrations after the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan over the 
weekend, the anger in the streets yesterday was far greater than in previous demonstrations. 
Protesters were inflamed by reports on the Iranian state-run channel Press TV that the Koran 
was desecrated over the weekend in the United States, Khoda said. Though a Florida pastor 
called off his plans to burn the Muslim holy book, the channel showed footage of a different 
man destroying a Koran in Tennessee. Most broadcasters around the world did not report 
prominently on scattered desecration events by a handful of fringe anti-Muslim activists in 
the United States; the Iranian broadcaster carried the footage repeatedly. The protesters 
chanted, ‗Down with Koran desecrators,‘ and protest leaders denounced the alleged 
desecration in speeches to the crowds. There were also shouts of ―Down with America‖ and 
―Down with Israel‖—rarely heard in Kashmir, where anger is normally directed at India. 
Id. 
 3. Jack Healy & Steven Erlanger, Planned Koran Burning Drew International Scorn, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010. Healy and Erlanger noted: 
The French, British and German governments, all with troops serving in Afghanistan, have 
joined the condemnations. France‘s Foreign Ministry called the idea ―an incitement to 
hatred,‖ with spokesman Bernard Valero calling it an ―insult to the memory of the victims of 
Sept. 11, like all the victims of acts of terrorism inspired by intolerance and the twisting of 
religion.‖ The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, said on Wednesday that burning Korans 
would be a ―repugnant‘ sign of disrespect, and the Vatican said it would be an ‗outrageous 
and grave gesture.‖ Brig. Gen. Hans-Werner Fritz, the commander of German troops in 
Afghanistan, said the burning would ―provide a trigger for violence towards all ISAF troops, 
including the Germans in northern Afghanistan.‖ A spokesman for the British Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, said, ―We would strongly oppose any attempt to offend any member of any 
religious or ethnic group. We are committed to religious tolerance.‖ Tony Blair, the former 
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The drama built to a crescendo as the ninth anniversary approached and 
only slightly leveled off when Pastor Jones announced the cancellation of 
his event.
4
 With this announcement came a sigh of relief from all the 
leaders who had vociferously condemned the pastor and his plans, but who 
did not question his right to such an act.
5
 In fact, many defended that right 
vigorously in response to an offhand suggestion that Quran burning might 
be unprotected speech.
6
 
Meanwhile, the Quran-burning trend began its transatlantic journey. In 
Gateshead, England, a group of men allegedly burned a Quran, videotaped 
the incident, and posted the video on YouTube, an online media-sharing 
website.
7
 Subsequent copycat incidents occurred in Michigan
8
 and 
France.
9
 While racial-incitement laws permitted charges against the 
individuals in England and France,
10
 the Ingham County Prosecutor did 
not charge the man in Michigan because he could not find a violation of 
any state law and concluded that burning a Quran is constitutionally 
protected.
11
 
 
 
British prime minister and Middle East envoy, called the notion ―disrespectful.‖ ―I deplore 
the act of burning the Koran,‖ Mr. Blair said. ―It is disrespectful, wrong and will be widely 
condemned by people of all faiths and none. In no way does this represent the view of any 
sensible person in the West or any other part of the world.‖ 
Id. 
 4. Gerhart & Londoño, supra note 1, at A6. 
 5. See id. 
 6. When Justice Stephen Breyer, in an interview several days after Pastor Jones canceled his 
Quran-burning event, suggested that Quran burning might be unprotected speech, his comments 
unleashed such a frenzy that he retreated from the remarks hastily, highlighting the extent to which 
freedom of speech is defended in the United States. Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, Justice Breyer’s 
Message: The Justice Talks About Battling Originalism and the Pitfalls of Simple Answers, NAT‘L L.J., 
Oct. 11, 2010, at 27, 30. 
 7. Nigel Bunyan & Heidi Blake,‘Koran Burning:’ Men Expected to Be Charged with Inciting 
Racial Hatred, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 24, 2010, at A12; see also Koran Burners Bailed, 
HERALD SUN (Australia), Sept. 25, 2010, at 32 (reporting on the release of the Quran burners on bail 
pending further inquiries); 6 Suspected in Quran Burning, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Michigan), Sept. 24, 
2010, at A12 (reporting on the arrest of the alleged English Quran burners in a Michigan newspaper, 
the same state where a similar incident was deemed unchargeable); Six Arrests Over Video of Koran 
Burning, HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 24, 2010, at 12 (reporting on the arrest of six alleged Quran 
burners). 
 8. Burned Quran Not a Hate Crime, UNITED PRESS INT‘L (Sept. 23, 2010, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/09/23/Burned-Koran-not-a-hate-crime/UPI-2199128527532 
3/ (reporting on the authorities‘ inability to find a chargeable crime stemming from an incident of 
Quran burning in Michigan, because such action is protected speech); see also Steve Pardo, Quran 
Burned in E. Lansing, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 14, 2010, at A3 (reporting on the burning of a Quran in E. 
Lansing, Michigan). 
 9. Gilbert Reilhac, France Charges Man for Burning, Urinating on Koran, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 
2010, 3:50 PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/maliNews/idAFLDE6941TG20101005. 
 10. Bunyan & Blake, supra note 7; Reilhac, supra note 9. 
 11. Burned Quran Not a Hate Crime, supra note 8. 
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This Note examines the legal ramifications of Quran burning both in 
the United States and abroad, locating the recent international trend of 
Quran burning within the context of the new realities in the world after 
9/11. With the rise of terrorism,
12
 an increasingly vitriolic and polarized 
political dialogue,
13
 and the ever-increasing ubiquity of the Internet,
14
 the 
profile of these issues will continue to grow.  
The public burning of Qurans highlights some of the more 
controversial aspects of the American First Amendment as well as 
suggests the true dangers of the European limitations on free speech.
15
 The 
significant risks the United States assumes when it allows controversial 
speech
16
 are still less than the grave risks people could otherwise take 
 
 
 12. Susan B. Glasser, U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 
2005, at A1.  
 13. On January 8, 2011, a shooting rampage targeting conservative Democratic Congressional 
Representative Gabrielle Giffords in the suburbs of Tucson, Arizona immediately sparked a 
nationwide debate over the correlation between violent political rhetoric and violent actions against 
public officials. Paul Krugman, Climate of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at 21. The debate centered 
around Sarah Palin, who had, in the course of the 2008 campaign, released a graphic depicting a map 
of the United States with what appeared to be crosshairs over the top targeted Congressional districts, 
including Rep. Giffords‘s district. Carl Hulse & Kate Zernike, Bloodshed Puts New Focus on Vitriol in 
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at 1. This, combined with Gov. Palin‘s oft-repeated refrain ―don‘t 
retreat . . . reload,‖ led to calls by many, mostly on the left, for a reduction in violent rhetoric. 
Krugman, at 21. Krugman‘s piece, ―true to the American tradition,‖ calls not for new restrictions on 
speech, but for Republican leaders to publicly renounce violent rhetoric. See id. 
 There is no way to tell for certain whether a uniform (e.g. legislative) reduction in violent rhetoric 
would decrease the frequency of incidents of politically motivated violence. However, this shooting 
and the debate that has followed have called into question whether more speech can truly be the best 
remedy for bad speech, as Justice Brandeis stated in concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Brian J. Buchanan, First Amendment Not on Trial 
in Giffords Shooting, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER BLOG (Jan. 10, 2011, 8:21:07 PM), http://www. 
firstamendmentcenter.org/free-speech-not-on-trial-in-giffords-shooting (arguing the absence of causal 
effect between mass media vitriol and political assassination); Frank Rich, No One Listened to 
Gabrielle Giffords, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at 10 (arguing the futility of calls for civil political 
discourse.). 
 14. See Superpower: Visualising the Internet, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/ 
8552410.stm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011); Internet World Stats: Users and Population Statistics, 
GLOBAL VILLAGE, http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2012).  
 15. See Howard Simon & Benetta Standly, An Ugly But Legal Form of Free Speech, 
GAINESVILLE.COM, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.gainesville.com/article/20100830/OPINION03/83010 
02 (―The Dove World Outreach Center plans to commemorate the September 11th terrorist attacks by 
burning copies of the Quran in a presumably sincere, but woefully misguided belief that America is at 
war with the Islamic faith. . . . But with the guarantee of religious freedom for all, the fundamental 
American right to protest—an essential element of the First Amendment‘s guarantee of freedom of 
expression—should also be honored.‖); see also Remembering Our Values, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 11, 
2010, at A11 (―[F]ree speech, including loud debate, is the defining characteristic of our form of 
government.‖). 
 16. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (―If there be a time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence.‖). For an example of this principle, see President Barack Hussein Obama, Remarks 
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when the state is allowed to decide what is acceptable speech, like in the 
European model. 
I. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND QURAN BURNING 
The freedom of speech is protected in the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, and states that ―Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech . . . .‖17 Since its ratification, those few words have 
begat numerous doctrines, some still good law, some long since cast aside, 
outlining the exceptions to freedom of speech, including incitement, 
fighting words, and symbolic speech.
18
 Beginning around the turn of the 
twentieth century, however, freedom of speech evolved into a sacrosanct 
principle of American culture, with doctrinal exceptions drawn only in 
rare circumstances.
19
 Protected speech ―is an integral part of American 
culture, resulting from our own history and experience. It is an American 
phenomenon.‖20  
When examining the question of Quran burning through the lens of 
each freedom of speech doctrine—symbolic speech, incitement, and 
fighting words—the strong presumption of protection for speech is evident 
based on historical and present interpretations of it.
21
 Because freedom of 
speech is a fundamental right,
22
 a review level of strict scrutiny review 
would likely apply to questions of whether speech is protected. Strict 
scrutiny review of any government restriction on the right would require 
the lawmaker to demonstrate that (1) there is a compelling interest for the 
restriction, (2) the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet that interest, and 
 
 
at Pentagon Memorial (Sept. 11, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/11/ 
remarks-president-pentagon-memorial (―They may seek to spark conflict between different faiths, but 
as Americans we are not—and never will be—at war with Islam. It was not a religion that attacked us 
that September day—it was al Qaeda, a sorry band of men which perverts religion. And just as we 
condemn intolerance and extremism abroad, so will we stay true to our traditions here at home as a 
diverse and tolerant nation. We champion the rights of every American, including the right to worship 
as one chooses—as service members and civilians from many faiths do just steps from here, at the 
very spot where the terrorists struck this building.‖).  
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.‖). 
 18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 931 (1st ed. 1997). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of the 
World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377, 378 (2006) (musing on the sharp divide between speech 
protections in the United States and abroad, and on the deeply ingrained nature of free speech in the 
United States as a part of its cultural heritage). 
 21. The framework for this section is based on CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 986–1122.  
 22. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 924–30. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/7
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(3) the government has chosen the least restrictive means to address the 
interest.
23
  
Given this framework, what would happen if, hypothetically, Terry 
Jones went through with his plans to burn the Quran and was subsequently 
arrested and convicted? 
A. Symbolic Speech 
If Jones had actually staged a mass burning of Qurans, it would have 
met the definition of symbolic speech, as opposed to mere conduct, 
defined by Spence v. Washington.
24
 After determining that it is symbolic 
speech, the question of whether this hypothetical Quran burning is 
protected speech remains unanswered. For that inquiry, the analysis turns 
to United States v. O’Brien.25  
In O’Brien, a draft card was burned in protest of the Vietnam War.26 
The draft card burner was convicted under a federal law prohibiting the 
destruction of such a document.
27
 Laying out a test for protected speech, 
the Supreme Court stated that regulation of conduct can sometimes 
infringe on the freedom of speech, but government regulation of conduct 
is justified if (1) it is within the constitutional powers of government, free 
speech aside; (2) it advances a significant government interest; (3) that 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech; and (4) the 
restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than necessary to 
accomplish the government interest.
28
  
Under the test in O’Brien, Pastor Jones‘ Quran-burning event would be 
considered protected speech, and government restriction of such an act 
would be unconstitutional. Holding a bonfire in an urban area would likely 
fall within government purview, and the regulation of it would advance a 
significant government interest—namely, the health and safety of local 
residents. However, because that interest is entirely related to the 
 
 
 23. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 671. 
 24. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). The initial question is whether Quran burning meets the definition of 
symbolic speech. In Spence v. Washington, a conviction under a Washington State statute dictating the 
proper display of an American flag was reversed, because it was unconstitutional as applied to the 
defendant. Id. In that case, the Supreme Court stated ―an intent to convey a particularized message was 
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.‖ Id. at 410–11. Quran burning meets this test, but that simply 
means that it is considered speech, not conduct.  
 25. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 26. Id. at 377 (clarifying the symbolic speech doctrine with a four-part test to determine if speech 
is protected). 
 27. Id. at 370. 
 28. Id. at 377. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
464 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:459 
 
 
 
 
suppression of free speech, the government regulation would fail the third 
element.
29
 
B. Incitement 
Under the theory of ―incitement,‖ speech is not protected when the 
speaker advocates or encourages unlawful action. In 1919, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote in Schenck v. United States
30
 that ―the most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,‖ and coined the phrase 
―clear and present danger‖ as a test of speech protection.31 This test and 
three other decisions that year evaluated the ―likelihood of imminent and 
significant harm‖ from the actions in question.32 The ―clear and present 
danger‖ doctrine was invoked often over the next three decades, though 
the test was criticized for its malleability.
33
 
A ―reasonableness approach‖ developed four years later with Gitlow v. 
New York
34
 and Whitney v. California,
35
 which declared that the courts 
will defer to the government so long as the government is reasonable in 
the exercise of its power.
36
 The ―risk formula‖ approach came next with 
 
 
 29. Subsequent cases, namely Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichmann, which apply the 
O’Brien rule to the burning of American flags, bear out this analysis. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
 30. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 31. Id. at 52 (―The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.‖). In his concurrence to Whitney v. 
California, Justice Brandeis wrote that ―to courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power 
of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing 
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so 
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.‖ Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
 32. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–21 (1919) (ruling that when the intent of 
a speech is to prevent recruiting, it is unprotected speech and a violation of the Espionage Act); 
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (upholding the Debs argument that when speech 
is intended to hinder recruiting it is unprotected, and commenting that ―the First Amendment while 
prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended 
to give immunity for every possible use of language‖); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 
(1919) (ruling that the incitement of a wartime munitions production strike for the express purpose of 
paralyzing the U.S. war effort was too great a likelihood of harm to garner speech protections).  
 33. Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of 
Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1166–73 (1982) (chronicling the establishment, 
application and judicial criticism of the ―clear and present danger‖ test from Schenck in 1919 to 
Dennis in 1951). 
 34. 268 U.S. 652 (1923). 
 35. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 357. 
 36. See id. at 372 (―We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or unreasonable 
exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press; and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/7
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Dennis v. United States
37
 in 1951, with the argument that probability and 
imminence are irrelevant, and that all that matters is the last prong of the 
Schenck test, the enormity of the risk of harm.
38
 
In 1969, the Supreme Court decided Brandenburg v. Ohio,
39
 which has 
since become the cornerstone case on evaluating the protection of speech. 
In the decision, the Court adopted a modified version of the Schenk test.
40
 
In order for government suppression of speech to be constitutional, the 
government must demonstrate three elements: (1) imminent harm from the 
speech, (2) a likelihood that the speech will produce illegal action, and (3) 
an intent to cause imminent illegality.
41
 This modern standard governs 
Jones‘s proposed Quran burning.  
Applying the Brandenburg test, Jones‘ proposed Quran burning event 
fails to meet the first element requiring imminent harm. Provided that he 
holds the event on his own land with proper permits and his own books, he 
will not physically harm people, animals, or the property of others, 
imminently or otherwise.
42
 The second element, a likelihood of inciting 
illegal acts, is also not present because there is no evidence of motivation 
from anyone to violate the law in support of Quran burning. Jones merely 
invited people to join him at his event.
43
 The third element, intent to cause 
imminent illegality, also fails. Pastor Jones‘ intent was an expression of 
his anger at Islam.
44
 With none of the three elements satisfied, Jones‘ 
hypothetical Quran burning event fails the modern test of incitement. 
 
 
we must and do sustain its constitutionality.‖). 
 37. 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951). 
 38. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 39. 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (outlining the surviving test for speech protection, featuring the 
elements of likelihood of imminent harm, risk of illegal action, and illegal intent). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 447 (―[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State 
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.‖). 
 42. John Couwels, City Plans to Bill Pastor for Security Around Planned Quran Burning, 
CNN.COM (Sept. 17, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-17/us/florida.quran.pastor_1_security-
plans-qurans-security-costs?_s=PM:US (specifying that Jones‘s church was the planned site of the 
event). 
 43. Lauren Russell, Church Plans Quran-Burning Event, CNN.COM (July 30, 2010),  
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-29/us/florida.burn.quran.day_1_quran-burning-florida-church-terry-
jones-american-muslims-religion?_s=PM:US (―Dove‘s Facebook page, set up for the September event, 
has more than 1,600 fans. ‗Eternal fire is the only destination the Quran can lead people to, so we want 
to put the Quran in it's [sic] place—the fire!‘ the page says.‖). 
 44. Id. (―The Dove World Outreach Center says it is hosting the event to remember 9/11 victims 
and take a stand against Islam.‖).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. Fighting Words 
Finally, the ―fighting words‖ doctrine evaluates the protection of 
speech when, in response, the speech elicits an unlawful reaction from 
others. In 1942, the Supreme Court decided Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire,
45
 where the Court defined ―fighting words‖ as ―those [that] by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace.‖46 Chaplinsky contemplates two situations that would be 
considered unprotected speech: (1) those words that are likely to cause a 
violent response against the speaker, and (2) those words that are likely to 
inflict emotional harm.
47
 While Chaplinsky has not been overturned, 
subsequent cases have narrowed the definition of unprotected ―fighting 
words‖ to the effect that no set of facts fits the definition. Indeed, in 
Gooding v. Wilson,
48
 a statute identical to the Chaplinsky statute was 
thrown out for overbreadth.
49
 The most recent illustration of the 
narrowness of this doctrine is the case of R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
50
 decided in 
1992, where a fighting words statute was struck down for viewpoint 
discrimination.
51
 A statutory restriction on Quran burning would likely 
follow this pattern, and would either be considered overbroad or viewpoint 
discrimination. Therefore, Terry‘s proposed Quran burning would likely 
be considered protected speech. 
Because of the strict limits on exceptions to protected speech in the 
United States that have evolved over a century of Supreme Court 
decisions, Quran burning would likely be considered protected speech by 
American courts. 
 
 
 45. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 46. Id. at 572 (introducing the ―fighting words‖ doctrine, a ruling that was subsequently 
narrowed into obscurity but never overruled). 
 47. Id.  
 48. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).  
 49. Id. at 527 (1972) (finding that a statute identical to that in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire was 
overbroad because it did not limit state restrictions to situations where there existed a risk of 
immediate breach of the peace); see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969) (finding a state 
statute that outlaws verbal disparagement unconstitutionally overbroad, and Street‘s words 
fundamental to his protest). 
 50. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 51. See id. at 379. Here, a municipal ordinance prohibited expression known to arouse ire or 
alarm in those who see it. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance, while meeting the standard 
for vagueness, is unconstitutional because it is not ―content-neutral,‖ e.g., it targets a particular type of 
speech and prohibits it on the basis of its substance. Id. at 394. This case illustrates the challenge of 
statutes utilizing the ―fighting words‖ doctrine—a statute that is not overly vague, and therefore 
unconstitutional, is unlikely to be content-neutral and therefore must be reviewed by courts under strict 
scrutiny, the most difficult standard of review under which a statute will survive. CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 18, at 1007. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/7
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II. INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES:  
SPEECH AND OTHER RIGHTS 
In 2005, France passed a law prohibiting incitement to religious 
hatred,
52
 and England and Wales followed suit a year later with the Racial 
& Religious Hatred Act 2006.
53
 These statutes built on a series of laws 
were passed long before the 9/11 attacks and restrict speech and conduct 
based on the content of the message.
54
 As critical race theorist
55
 Mari 
Matsuda observes, ―the knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and 
the rise of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the 
emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred.‖56 Many 
countries, but especially European countries, crafted their laws so that 
―international human rights norms . . . treat freedom of speech as an 
important right, but one that must be balanced against other democratic 
rights.‖57  
 
 
 52. Decree No. 2005-284 of Mar. 25, 2005, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O] 
[Official Gazette of France], Mar. 30, 2005, p. 5752, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
affichTexte.do;jsessionid=1B09771D3B23D96B137C9169E86B67F4.tpdjo13v_2?cidTexte=JORFTE
XT000000257363&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id (providing the French law 
prohibiting incitement to religious hatred). 
 53. See Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c. 1, § 1, sched. 3A (Eng.) (providing the English 
law prohibiting incitement to racial and religious hatred). 
 54. See Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 17 (Eng.) (meaning of ―racial hatred‖); see also Race 
Relations Act, 1965, c. 73, § 6 (Eng.) (outlawing incitement to racial hatred); Race Relations Act, 
1976, c. 74, § 70 (Eng.) (incitement to racial hatred)); Law No. 90-615 of July 13, 1990, Journal 
Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 14, 1990, p. 8333, 
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000532990&date 
Texte=&categorieLien=id (providing the Gayssot Act, the French law prohibiting Holocaust denial). 
 55. Critical race theory is an academic discipline, developed in the 1970s, that encourages the 
consideration of legal and political issues through the prism of race. For a more detailed explanation of 
the genre, see MARI MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO, & KIMBERLÈ 
WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3–7 (1993). 
 56. Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Telling the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2320, 2342 (1989). Matsuda articulated: 
To those who struggled through early international attempts to deal with racist propaganda, 
the competing values [of free speech, association and conscience] had a sense of urgency. The 
imagery of both book burnings and swastikas was clear in their minds. Hitler had banned 
ideas. He had also murdered six million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a 
major theme the idea of racial superiority. While the causes of fascism are complex, the 
knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the rise of Nazism were clearly connected 
guided development of the emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred. 
 57. Sedler, supra note 20, at 379 (describing the freedom of speech as a right that, in Europe, is 
held equal to, not above, other human rights). 
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A. International Law: The European Court of Human Rights 
Founded in 1959 under the terms of the 1953 European Convention, 
the European Court of Human Rights (―European Court‖) interprets the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (―ECHR‖) in cases brought by individuals and 
states against the member states of the Council of Europe who are party to 
the European Convention.
58
 Article 10 Section 1 of the ECHR guarantees 
the freedom of expression ―without interference by public authority,‖59 but 
Section 2 of the same article states that this freedom is ―subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society . . . .‖60 While the U.S. 
Constitution holds freedom of speech as a paramount right, the European 
model treats it merely as one right that must be weighed against other 
democratic rights, such as dignity and privacy.
61
 
The decisions of the European Court, per a protocol that came into 
force in April 2010, are binding on the member states in judgments to 
which they are parties.
62
 This new protocol strengthened the enforcement 
abilities of the European Court.
63
 Several decisions have come out of the 
European Court concerning the intersection of freedom of speech and 
 
 
 58. European Court of Human Rights In Brief, (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure_EN_Portes_ouvertes.pdf (introducing the 
European Court of Human Rights). 
 59. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
10 § 1, Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (―Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.‖). 
 60. ECHR, supra note 59, art. 10 § 2 (―The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.‖). 
 61. Guy E. Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26 B.U. 
INT‘L L.J. 277, 279 (2008) (arguing that the United States stands alone in regarding freedom of speech 
as a higher priority than other human rights). 
 62. ECHR, supra note 59, art. 46 § 1 (―The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the 
final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties . . . .‖). 
 63. Alex Ballin & Alison McDonald, A Law with Sharper Teeth, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 
24, 2010, at 32, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/mar/23/ 
european-court-human-rights (―The Committee of Ministers can refer a case back to the European 
court if it considers that the state has not fully complied with a decision of the court. If the court 
agrees, the committee can decide to take action against the state for noncompliance—including, in 
theory, suspension or expulsion from the Council of Europe.‖). 
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incitement to racial and religious hatred, including two cases which 
illuminate the boundary between what is acceptable and unacceptable 
speech, as determined by the ECHR.
64
  
In Sürek v. Turkey,
65
 a news publication was charged under Turkish 
law with ―disseminating propaganda against the indivisibility of the State 
and provoking enmity and hatred among the people‖ when it published 
several letters denouncing the Turkish Army for attacks against Kurds.
66
 
The European Court derived three elements from Article 10 in order to 
evaluate whether the interference with the applicant‘s right to freedom of 
expression: (1) whether it was ―prescribed by law‖; (2) whether it 
possessed one or more of the goals listed in Section 2 of Article 10; and 
(3) whether the interference was ―necessary in a democratic society‖ to 
achieve the aims of Section 2.
67
  
The European Court found no violation of Article 10 in this case, 
stating that ―where such remarks incite to violence . . . , the State 
authorities enjoy a wider margin of appreciation when examining the need 
for an interference with freedom of expression.‖68 
Conversely, in Giniewski v. France,
69
 the European Court found a 
violation of the applicant‘s freedom of speech right when the author of a 
news article criticizing a papal encyclical was charged with making 
―racially defamatory statements against the Christian community.‖70 The 
European Court noted that ―such views do not in themselves preclude the 
enjoyment of freedom of expression. . . . Moreover, the article in question 
is not ‗gratuitously offensive‘ . . . and does not incite disrespect or 
hatred.‖71 The European Court also incorporated truth as a possible 
 
 
 64. ECHR, supra note 59, art. 10 § 1 (defining legal and illegal speech when incitement to racial 
and religious hatred is a factor). 
 65. Sürek v. Turkey (No.1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=surek&sessionid=96127695&skin=h
udoc-en. 
 66. Id. at 6 (holding the Turkish statute did not violate Article 10 of the ECHR).  
 67. Id. at 22.  
 68. Id. at 26–27 (―[I]t certainly remains open to the competent State authorities to adopt, in their 
capacity as guarantors of the public order, measures, even of a criminal-law nature, intended to react 
appropriately and without excess to such remarks . . . . [W]here such remarks incite to violence against 
and individual or a public official or a sector of the population, the State authorities enjoy a wider 
margin of appreciation when examining the need for an interference with freedom of expression.‖). 
 69. Giniewski v. France, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, available at http://strasbourgconsortium.org/ 
document.php?DocumentID=4183 (European Court of Human Rights found the conviction to have 
violated the free speech right of the applicant).  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 14. 
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defense and stated, ―Nor does [the article in question] cast doubt in any 
way on clearly established historical facts.‖72 
Applying Article 10 to Quran burning, the European Court is likely to 
find that a state is within its rights to restrict such an act. Quran burning is 
proscribed in the domestic laws of many member states.
73
 Those laws 
comport with the goals listed in Article 10 Section 2 because, arguably, 
they protect ―the interests of national security‖ by limiting violence 
against nationals, both in country and in military theaters, like Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
74
 They protect ―the rights of others‖ by limiting violent 
demonstrations aimed squarely at one sector of society: Muslims.
75
 
Furthermore, like in Giniewski, Quran burning is likely to be considered 
violence, so the European Court would broadly construe its responsibility 
to intervene.
76
  
B. The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (―ICCPR‖) 
signed in 1966 and entered into force in 1976, is an international 
agreement that names all civil and political rights enjoyed by the citizens 
of its member states, including freedoms of speech.
77
 It is unique because 
no single designated court adjudicates this convention.
78
 The Human 
Rights Committee of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is 
empowered to receive reports from the participating countries on the status 
of their enumerated rights, hear individual complaints of violations, and 
publish ―general comments‖ about the state of the enumerated rights 
within the participating countries.
79
 Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees 
 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Decree No. 2005-284 of Mar. 25, 205, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O] 
[Official Gazette of France], Mar. 30, 2005, p. 5752; Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, c. 1, § 1, 
sched. 3A (Eng.). 
 74. ECHR, supra note 59, art. 10 § 2. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Giniewski v. France, 2006-II, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 77. Int‘l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 1, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing an international agreement governing the civil and 
political rights of individuals).  
 78. The International Court of Justice has interpreted the ICCPR in past cases, such as the case 
about Ahmadou Sadio Diallo. Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 
2010 I.C.J. 103 (Nov. 30, 2010). 
 79. Office of the U.N. High Comm‘r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm.: Monitoring Civil 
and Political Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ (describing the charge of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights with regard to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2012] QURAN BURNING AND RELIGIOUS HATRED 471 
 
 
 
 
freedom of expression in general,
80
 but Article 20 proscribes war 
propaganda
81
 and ―any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.‖82 
The ICCPR clearly illustrates the difference in the American and 
European approaches to the issue of speech protection.
83
 Essentially, 
European law declines to subscribe to the principle of content neutrality, 
the idea that speech cannot be restricted based on the substance of a 
message.
84
 By qualifying speech freedom so dramatically in Article 20, the 
drafters of the ICCPR weaken the ―value judgment in Article 19 that 
freedom of speech is an important individual right that should be 
protected,‖85 thereby declaring that some ideas are so harmful that they 
should not be protected.
86
 Indeed, the United States ratified the ICCPR 
only after asserting its reservation to Article 20.
87
 
The laws of each country that ratified the ICCPR are subject to review 
under the Covenant, which means that while France, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and most other countries have passed their own laws on 
freedom of speech and incitement of racial hatred, those laws must 
conform to the ICCPR as well as any applicable national constitution.
88
 
 
 
 80. ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 19. 
 81. Id. art. 20 (―Any propaganda for war shall be proscribed by law. Any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law.‖). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See generally Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison 
of the American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305 (1999). 
 84. Id. at 317. 
 85. Sedler, supra note 20, at 381. 
 86. Id. at 380–81 (―The drafters of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights made 
a value judgment in Article 19 that freedom of speech is an important individual right that should be 
protected. But in Article 20, they qualified the protection given to freedom of speech by denying 
protection to what they considered to be particularly harmful ideas, such as the ‗advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.‘‖) (citing 
ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 20). 
 87. S. Exec. Res. 95-2, 102d Cong., 138 Cong. Rec. 4783 (1992) (enacted) (―Article 20 does not 
authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free 
speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.‖). 
 88. See U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ 
Add. 13, ¶¶ 6–8 (May 26, 2004). The comment provides: 
 (6) . . . . States Parties must refrain from violation of the rights recognized by the 
Covenant, and any restrictions on any of those rights must be permissible under the relevant 
provisions of the Covenant. Where such restrictions are made, States must demonstrate their 
necessity and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate 
aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights. In no case 
may the restrictions be applied or invoked in a manner that would impair the essence of a 
Covenant right. 
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Thus, anyone charged under these laws can argue that as applied, the laws 
are not in keeping with the guarantees of the ICCPR.
89
  
III. TREATMENT OF HATE SPEECH IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Within many European countries, hate speech has traditionally been 
curtailed in the context of both racial and religious hatred.
90
 While these 
countries have stressed the need for restraint in legislation, they apply 
stricter measures than the United States in restricting unacceptable 
speech.
91
 Events in other European countries, such as Denmark
92
 and 
France,
93
 have catalyzed discussion of the balance of various human rights 
and set the stage for Britain‘s dialogue about Quran burning. 
 
 
 (7) Article 2 requires that States Parties adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, 
educative and other appropriate measures in order to fulfill their legal obligations. The 
Committee believes that it is important to raise levels of awareness about the Covenant not 
only among public officials and State agents but also among the population at large. (8) The 
article 2, paragraph 1, obligations are binding on States [Parties] and do not, as such, have 
direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law. 
Id. ¶¶ 6–8. 
 89. See id. ¶ 3 (―A general obligation is imposed on States Parties to respect the Covenant rights 
and to ensure them to all individuals in their territory and subject to their jurisdiction . . . .‖). 
 90. Mike Sacks, What if Terry Jones Went to Sweden? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2010, 
at 7, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/1002/Free-speech-What-if-Terry-
Jones-went-to-Sweden (speculating on the potential consequences of Quran burning in various 
European countries, just prior to actual incidents that occurred in England and France). Sacks 
articulates,  
[M]uch of Europe has also enacted hate speech laws that allow for prosecution of expression 
where the United States does not. Had Terry Jones, pastor of the Dove World Outreach 
Center in Gainesville, Fla., taken his ―International Burn a Koran Day‘ overseas and arrived 
in Stockholm wearing one of the ‗Islam Is of the Devil‘ T-shirts that his church sells, he could 
have been charged under Sweden's prohibition on expressing disrespect for a group based on 
their faith. 
Id. 
 91. See Carmi, supra note 61. 
 92. A recent controversy over the depiction of a sacred religious figure in a European newspaper 
gives a good illustration of the European climate with regard to speech protections.  
 In 2005, Flemming Rose, the editor of Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten, solicited cartoons 
featuring the Islamic prophet Mohammed and then published a selection of them. JYTTE KLAUSEN, 
THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD 1 (2009). This outraged Muslims all over the world, not 
only because most of the depictions were caricatures but also because of a fundamental belief that 
depictions of the Prophet in general are blasphemy within Islam. Kahn, supra note 37, at 260–63.  
 Instead of backing down in the face of Muslim outrage, Rose grew louder and more obstinate in 
defending his actions on free speech grounds. Id. at 263–67. Rose essentially made two arguments: 
(1) that absolute free speech, without restriction, was needed to fight totalitarianism; and (2) a 
convoluted argument that the cartoons were a way of bringing Muslim immigrants into the mainstream 
satirical culture of Denmark. Id. at 254–58. Flemming‘s first argument draws from the American 
tradition of free speech. Id. at 267.  
 93. Designer Galliano is Fined for Insults, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2011, at A7 (detailing the 
conviction of French fashion designer John Galliano for anti-Semitic rants). Galliano was convicted of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/7
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The primary law regulating incitement of racial hatred in the United 
Kingdom is Public Order Act 1986, which defined racial hatred and 
criminalized a number of actions that incited it.
94
 It was amended by the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which expanded the crimes against 
racial hatred to explicitly include religious hatred.
95
 
The Crown Prosecution Service (―CPS‖), which handles criminal 
prosecutions in England and Wales,
96
 publishes guidance on its website 
for the prosecution and handling of cases involving ―violent extremism.‖97 
It advises that while ―free speech includes the right to offend . . . there 
have been prosecutions for deeply insulting behavior. This is behavior 
which falls short of a desire to commit violence but is nevertheless 
threatening, abusive or insulting, and intends to stir up racial hatred.‖98  
The CPS‘s guide states that in order to charge an actor with stirring 
racial hatred under Public Order Act 1986, ―[i]f we are not able to prove 
that the accused intended to stir up racial hatred, we have to show that . . . 
hatred was likely to be stirred up, not simply liable or possible.‖99 
Considering that freedom of speech is regarded as a core democratic value, 
this standard is an extremely low bar, given that a prosecutor need not 
even prove intent except in cases of religious hatred, but rather needs 
merely prove a conscious disregard, effectively, of the likelihood of 
incitement. 
A variety of cases have been tried under the 1986 U.K. statute. In 
Regina v. Saleem,
100
 decided in 2007, a protestor shouting slogans calling 
for massacre of ―those who insult Islam‖ was convicted on several charges 
 
 
making ―public insults based on origin, religious affiliation, race or ethnicity.‖ Id. He was ordered to 
pay nominal damages to his victims. Id.  
 94. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, pt. III (Eng.). 
 95. Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c. 1, §§ 1, sched. 3A, 29A (Eng.) (―The Public Order 
Act 1986 (c. 64) is amended in accordance with the Schedule to this Act, which creates offences 
involving stirring up hatred against persons on religious grounds. . . . Meaning of ‗religious hatred‘[:] 
 In this Part ‗religious hatred‘ means hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to 
religious belief or lack of religious belief.‖). 
 96. Facts About the Crown Prosecution Serv., CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. [CPS], http://www. 
cps.gov.uk/about/facts.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2012) (describing the function of the crown 
prosecution service). 
 97. Violent Extremism and Related Offences, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. [CPS], http://www. 
cps .gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent_extremism.html#a3 (describing its authority to prosecute 
cases where actions fall short of violence but are so offensive as to illegally stir up racial or religious 
hatred). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. pt. 3. Although intent is not a required element to prove racial hatred, it is a required 
element in cases of religious hatred. Id.  
 100. R v. Saleem [2007] EWCA Crim. 2692, [2007] 2 Crim. App. 12 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(upholding the conviction of individuals protesting the Mohammed cartoon controversy for inciting 
religious hatred with signs that read, ―massacre those who insult Islam‖ and similar slogans).  
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and was sentenced to two years and six months in jail specifically on the 
charges of stirring racial hatred.
101
 In Regina v. Rahman,
102
 decided in 
2008, a protestor was sentenced to three years in jail for ―using 
threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior with intent to stir up 
racial hatred or in circumstances where racial hatred was likely to be 
stirred up.‖103 In Regina v. Sheppard,104 decided in 2010, two defendants 
were convicted of numerous charges of stirring up racial hatred by way of 
possessing, distributing, and publishing racially inflammatory material and 
sentenced to three years and ten months and one year and ten months, 
respectively.
105
 
Upon the arrest of the two individuals in Gateshead, England who were 
shown in the Quran-burning video on YouTube, the Northumbria Police 
Department issued a statement saying that ―[t]he kind of behaviour 
displayed in this video is not at all representative of our community as a 
whole. Our community is one of mutual respect and we continue to work 
together with community leaders, residents and people of all faiths and 
beliefs to maintain good community relations.‖106 Clearly, the emphasis in 
the Police Department‘s statement is not on the individual rights of the 
arrested parties to freedom of speech but on the community‘s right to 
avoid enduring such speech.  
The CPS declined to prosecute the Gateshead case, claiming a lack of 
evidence.
107
 However, in applying the amended Public Order Act 1986 to 
incidents of Quran burning, a court would likely find the facts to fit 
squarely within the elements enumerated by CPS for charging and 
conviction. The burning of a Quran demonstrates intent to stir up religious 
hatred, as defined by Section 17,
108
 with its message, and the 
 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. R v. Rahman [2008] EWCA Crim. 2290, [2008] W.L. 4552817 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(upholding the conviction of individuals protesting as inciting religious hatred but allowing for the 
concurrent service of sentence for the more serious charge of solicitation of murder as well as allowing 
credit for time served, which effectively nullified the sentence but held in place the conviction).  
 103. Id. 
 104. R. v. Sheppard [2010] EWCA Crim 65, [2010] W.L. 308489 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(upholding conviction of an inciting racial hatred violation for the publishing of inflammatory material 
on a website, and upholding the length of the imprisonment sentence as neither excessive nor unusual).  
 105. Id. 
 106. Arrests for Stirring Hatred, NORTHUMBRIA POLICE AUTHORITY (Sept. 23, 2010), http:// 
www.northumbria.police.uk/news_and_events/news/newsindex/details.asp?id=32209 (describing the 
arrest of two individuals in Gateshead, England and their subsequent charging with incitement to racial 
or religious hatred violations in connection with the videotaped burning of a Quran and uploading of 
the act on YouTube). 
 107. No Prosecution Over Gateshead Car Park Koran Burning, BBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne-12253315. 
 108. Guidance on Prosecuting Cases of Racist and Religious Crime: Part III Public Order Act 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/7
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dissemination of the video of the Quran burning falls within Section 21 of 
the statute.
109
  
IV. NO BOUNDARIES: INTERNATIONAL HATE SPEECH AND THE INTERNET 
In order to evaluate the efficacy of modern speech-freedom rules, one 
must consider the influence of the internet, which has presented two new 
distinct but related challenges to the question of protected speech: (1) the 
elimination of traditional national boundaries, and (2) the evolving 
definition of ―immediacy.‖ 
A. Immediacy 
The definition of ―immediacy‖ has shifted, as contemplated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Brandenburg.
110
 Describing the internet in Reno v. 
ACLU,
111
 the Supreme Court observed that ―any person with a phone line 
can become a town crier with a voice that resonates further than it would 
from any soap box,‖ highlighting the significant difference between the 
 
 
1986—Incitement to Racial Hatred, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. [CPS], http://www.cps.gov.uk/ 
publications/prosecution/rrpbcrpol.html (―Racial hatred is defined in Section 17 of the Act. The 
prosecution must prove that hatred was intended to be stirred up or that it was likely to be stirred up. 
‗Likely‘ does not mean that racial hatred was simply possible. We therefore have to examine the 
context of any behaviour very carefully, in particular the likely audience, as this will be highly 
relevant.‖). 
 109. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, pt. III, § 21 (Eng.). The Act provides:  
Distributing, showing or playing a recording 
(1) A person who distributes, or shows or plays, a recording of visual images or 
sounds which are threatening, abusive or insulting is guilty of an offence if— 
 (a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or  
 (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up 
thereby. 
(2) In this Part ‗recording‘ means any record from which visual images or sounds 
may, by any means, be reproduced; and references to the distribution, showing or 
playing of a recording are to its distribution, showing or playing to the public or a 
section of the public. 
(3) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for an accused who 
is not shown to have intended to stir up racial hatred to prove that he was not aware 
of the content of the recording and did not suspect, and had no reason to suspect, that 
it was threatening, abusive or insulting. 
(4) This section does not apply to the showing or playing of a recording solely for the 
purpose of enabling the recording to be broadcast or included in a programme 
service. 
Id. § 21. 
 110. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 111. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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speech contemplated less than a century ago and the modern reality.
112
 
Several recent cases have grappled with this new challenge.
113
 
The internet is unique because it makes dissemination of information 
and ideas to the world effortless, making it available for all to access. Is 
this characteristic significant enough to warrant a revision of the rules of 
speech protection? Judge Lynn Adelman in the U.S. District Court of the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin argues against that notion, stating, ―nothing 
about the Internet requires a new test. We should resist letting fear of a 
new technology get the better of us. The First Amendment challenges 
posed by the twenty-first century are not new.‖114 She continues to explain 
that ―when the Supreme Court decided Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969, it 
established a framework that has well protected the values served by the 
First Amendment, and . . . nothing about the Internet suggests a need to 
modify that framework.‖115 
B. International Regulation of the Internet 
Since the creation of YouTube in 2005
116
 and the advent of 
innumerable news websites and blogs in the last two decades, the legal 
boundaries between countries have, in a technological context, become 
vestigial.
117
 While countries have attempted to regulate the internet and 
 
 
 112. Id. at 870 (―This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only 
traditional print and news services, but also audio, video and still images, as well as interactive, real-
time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier 
with a voice that resonates farther than it would from any soapbox.‖). 
 113. A recent case, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists, illustrates the phenomenon described by the Reno Court. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). In 
Planned Parenthood, the names and pictures of abortion providers were published on a website 
―Wanted‖ poster. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that act constituted unlawful incitement 
and therefore unprotected speech, because the posters identified specific doctors as targets and the 
organization that created the website was aware of its potential to encourage others to act unlawfully. 
Id. at 1063.  
 114. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The Continuing 
Importance of Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 361, 363 (2010) (―For much of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court struggled to formulate a standard for evaluating advocacy under the First 
Amendment. In Brandenburg, the Court settled on a test that balances the genuine security needs of 
society with the need to maintain a public sphere open to all. Nothing about the internet requires a new 
test. We should resist letting fear of a new technology get the better of us. The First Amendment 
challenges posed by the twenty-first century are not new.‖).  
 115. Id.  
 116. John Cloud, The Gurus of YouTube, TIME, Dec. 16, 2006, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570721,00.html (describing the creation and subsequent rise in 
popularity of YouTube, a website facilitating the public uploading and sharing of video and audio 
files). 
 117. Christopher D. Van Blarcum, Internet Hate Speech: The European Framework and the 
Emerging American Haven, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781, 782 (2005) (describing the differences 
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control its content, these efforts have achieved limited success.
118
 Because 
of the anonymity and global accessibility of the internet, countries have 
struggled to find both appropriate legal limitations and the requisite 
regulatory technology.
119
 
There have been notable cases testing the question of whether 
European countries can regulate internet content that is uploaded beyond 
its continental shores: Jones v. Toben,
120
 People v. Somm,
121
 and Yahoo!, 
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme (LICRA).
122
 In Toben, a 
website based in Australia hosted content that violates Germany‘s 
Holocaust denial laws.
123
 A German lower court ruled that the laws could 
not reach content hosted outside the country, but Germany‘s High Court 
reversed the decision in 2003.
124
 In Somm, a German court found that 
these laws could apply when content was hosted outside the country, and 
that the internet service provider could be held liable for violation of the 
laws.
125
 In Yahoo!, an American company was sued in a French court for 
selling Nazi merchandise on its auction website.
126
 In 2000, the French 
court ordered Yahoo! to take the content off its website, and Yahoo! 
counter-sued in the Northern District of California, a U.S. federal court, 
for a declaratory judgment that the French order could not be executed.
127
 
In issuing the judgment, the district court cited the free speech protections 
of the First Amendment; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later reversed 
because the district court lacked personal jurisdiction.
128
 
The Terry Jones ―Burn a Quran‖ Day and the U.K. Quran-burning 
episode pull into clear focus the nature of the problem. In the case of 
 
 
between speech protection in the United States and Europe, the reasons behind those differences, and 
the practical consequences therein.). 
 118. See id. at 803–07. 
 119. Id. at 802–03 (―The effect of the [Council of Europe‘s Additional] Protocol [to the 
Convention on Cybercrime] and the hate speech legislation adopted by Europe is likely to extend 
beyond the parties to the agreement. European nations have a history of attempting to enforce their 
Internet content laws against content uploaded from sources outside Europe, and they view their 
jurisdiction based on where the content was read. Such litigation has produced three high-profile cases: 
Toben, Somm, and Yahoo!‖).  
 120. Jones v. Toben, (2002) 71 A.L.D. 629 (Austl.). 
 121. Amtsgericht [Munich Regional Court] 17 Nov. 1999, File no. 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95, 
available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/isps/somm-dec.htm. 
122. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184 
(N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 123. Van Blarcum, supra note 117, at 803. 
 124. Id. at 803–04. 
 125. Id. at 804. 
 126. Id. at 805. 
 127. Id. at 806. 
 128. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
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Jones, the news of ―Burn a Quran‖ Day traveled around the world within 
minutes and resulted in violent protests in many different countries.
129
 In 
England, the six Quran burners allegedly posted their video on 
YouTube,
130
 which meant that with the click of a button, users all over the 
world could access the footage.  
While Judge Adelman‘s assessment of the changes in immediacy is too 
dismissive of the power of YouTube and other newer sites that enhance 
the ease with which hate speech is disseminated, she is right that there is 
no better standard than the Brandenburg rule.
131
 While YouTube and other 
media-sharing sites may amplify free speech to an uncomfortable extent, 
the alternative, government regulation of speech based on content, is 
incompatible with American concepts of free speech.  
V. A HARD CHOICE: DISTASTEFUL SPEECH OR GOVERNMENT 
CENSORSHIP? 
The primary difference between the freedom of speech in the United 
States and Europe is the question of whether speech can be restricted on 
the basis of its content under current laws. Robert Sedler highlights this 
difference when he states that ―[i]n the United States, as a constitutional 
matter, the value of freedom of speech generally prevails over other 
democratic values, such as equality, human dignity, and privacy.‖132 This 
principle lies in stark contrast to the European vision of freedom of 
speech, in which ―freedom of speech is an important right, but one that 
must be balanced against other democratic rights.‖133 
Ultimately, the decision whether to judge speech based on its content 
becomes a choice between the lesser of two evils: Do we trust the people 
to police themselves when there is an opportunity for full discussion on a 
controversial message (the Brandeis ―more speech as a remedy for bad 
speech‖ paradigm)?134 Alternatively, do we delegate the responsibility for 
discerning acceptable speech to the government?  
The recent Quran-burning incidents demonstrate the messiness of the 
American approach. The law did not restrict Pastor Jones at all in his 
threats. Instead, what occurred was a proliferation of Brandeis‘ ―more 
 
 
 129. Gerhart & Londoño, supra note 1. 
 130. See Bunyan & Blake, supra note 7. 
 131. Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 114, at 373. 
 132. Sedler, supra note 20, at 379.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (introducing the modern free speech 
doctrine of more speech as a remedy for bad speech). 
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speech.‖ Leaders including President Obama, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, General David Petraeus, and 
even the owner of a car dealership in New Jersey, urged Jones to cancel 
his event. All declined to question his right to burn Qurans.
135
 The outcry 
succeeded: Jones retreated in his rhetoric and cancelled his event.
136
  
The incident and the American reaction to it resulted in two adverse 
consequences. First, the international community, including many who 
were not well acquainted with the American concept of protected 
speech,
137
 reacted violently to both Jones‘ threats and to the lack of 
government restriction on his speech.
138
 This response is an 
internationalization of the ―heckler‘s veto,‖ the notion that the speaker‘s 
speech rights should be curtailed for fear of the reaction of his audience. 
The idea has already been debated in the U.S. court system and discarded 
as an invalid exception to free speech.
139
  
 
 
 135. Gerhart & Londoño, supra note 1; Pastor Who Said He'd Burn Koran Gets Free Car, Gives 
It To Charity, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2010, at 2, available at http://articles.boston.com/2010-10-23/ 
news/29293713_1_florida-pastor-koran-car-dealer (describing the aftermath of Pastor Terry Jones‘s 
threat to burn Qurans in protest on September 11). 
 136. Gerhart & Londoño, supra note 1. 
 137. An unfortunate illustration of the lack of international familiarity with the American system 
of free speech occurred during the daily press briefing at the White House on January 13, 2011, in the 
wake of the Gabrielle Giffords shooting rampage. Ed Henry, Chill in the White House Briefing Room, 
CNN ONLINE (Jan. 13, 2011), http://whitehouse.blogs.cnn.com/2011/01/13/chill-in-the-white-house-
briefing-room/. At the end of the briefing, a Russian reporter with Itar-Tass, the official Russian news 
agency, asked whether ―the quote, unquote ‗freedom‘ of a deranged mind to react in a violent way is 
also American,‖ implying that the United States, with its liberal interpretation of Constitutional 
freedoms, condones behavior like the rampage that had taken place in Tucson, Arizona five days 
before. Id. Robert Gibbs, the outgoing White House Press Secretary, quickly responded that,  
We had people that died. We had people whose lives will be changed forever because of the 
deranged actions of a madman. Those are not American. Those are not in keeping with the 
important bedrock values by which this country was founded and by which its citizens live 
each and every day of their lives in hopes of something better for those that are here. 
Id. Later, the correspondent Andrei Sitov, when asked about the interchange, proffered essentially the 
same viewpoint given by this note, saying he ―believe[d] that what happened is a terrible price that the 
United States pays for the freedoms and liberties that Americans enjoy.‖ Id. While it would be a 
disservice to attribute the views of the world at large to one White House reporter, Sitov‘s comments 
do suggest that perhaps it is more than mere misunderstanding or ignorance of the American system of 
Constitutional freedoms, but perhaps a fundamental disagreement with it. Id. See also Robert Gibbs, 
White House Press Briefing, WHITE HOUSE ONLINE (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2011/01/13/press-briefing-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-1132011. A Lecture Russia 
Wouldn’t Permit, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 16, 2011, at A17 (editorial reaction to the exchange 
between Gibbs and Sitov that criticizes the very premise of Sitov‘s argument because his country has 
historically exemplified excessive governmental restriction on speech.)  
 138. See id. 
 139. In Smith v. Collin, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that ―[a] conviction for less 
than words that at least tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace cannot be justified,‖ once again 
affirming the high standard that must be met in order to justify a lack of protected speech. 578 F.2d 
1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978). In that decision, the Seventh Circuit wrote, ―The concession also 
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Second, the incident led to similar episodes in Michigan, England,
 
and 
France.
140
 There will likely be more Quran-burning incidents, especially in 
the United States around the anniversary of 9/11. These occurrences are 
unfortunate, but they will happen regardless of whether the act is illegal.
141
 
Especially with the prevalence of online-media sharing, prior restraint is 
simply not feasible in most circumstances, yet prior restraint would be 
required in order to keep these destructive ideas from spreading virally. 
In contrast, individuals were criminally charged after burning Qurans 
in Strasbourg, France and Gateshead, England. Instead of calming public 
furor over the burning of Qurans, the incident sparked a debate over 
speech restrictions.
142
 Some might argue that criminalizing bad speech 
provides a channel for public anger and reduces vigilantism against the 
speakers,
143
 but these cases have not borne out that theory. 
Speech protection via the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is 
a messy system that allows ideas to circulate in a manner disagreed with 
by many. Nonetheless, the U.S. approach to freedom of speech is still a 
superior system to one that circumvents the right of the people to decide
 
 
eliminates any argument based on the fighting words doctrine of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. . . . 
The Court in Chaplinsky affirmed a conviction under a statute that, as authoritatively construed, 
applied only to words with a direct tendency to cause violence by the persons to whom, individually, 
the words were addressed.‖ Id. (citing Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942)). 
 140. See Burned Koran Not a Hate Crime, supra note 8; Bunyan & Blake, supra note 7; Reilhac, 
supra note 9. 
 141. Sacks, supra note 90 (offering examples of individuals expressing themselves even where it 
is illegal to do so). 
 142. See William Dove, Gateshead Koran Burning: Since When Was Islam a Race and Why Are 
the Police Watching YouTube When They Could Be Stopping Real Crime? INT‘L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 23, 
2010), http://uk.ibtimes.com/articles/65079/20100923/gateshead-koran-burning-since-when-was-islam-a-
race-and-why-are-the-police-watching-youtube-when-the.htm (questioning the incitement of hatred 
doctrine in British law as a misappropriation of police resources); see also Padraig Reidy, Koran 
Burning in the U.K., FREE SPEECH BLOG (Sept. 23, 2010), http://blog.indexoncensorship.org/2010/09/ 
23/koran-burning-gateshead-islam-free-speech/ (objecting to the arrest of the individuals in Gateshead 
on incitement charges). 
 143. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (―Free speech has 
occupied an exalted position because of the high service it has given our society. Its protection is 
essential to the very existence of a democracy. The airing of ideas releases pressures which otherwise 
might become destructive.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2012] QURAN BURNING AND RELIGIOUS HATRED 481 
 
 
 
 
for themselves what ideas they disagree with and to respond 
accordingly.
144
 
Catherine Blue Holmes
 
 
 144. In a fitting epilogue to the tale of ―Burn a Quran Day,‖ Pastor Terry Jones was banned from 
the United Kingdom in January 2011, ahead of a planned address to a right-wing group in 
Buckhamshire, England. US Pastor Terry Jones Banned from Entering UK, BBC NEWS ONLINE (Jan. 
19, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12231832 (―The Home Office said Mr Jones could not enter 
the UK as the government ‗opposes extremism in all its forms‘. . . . A Home Office spokesman said: 
‗Numerous comments made by Pastor Jones are evidence of his unacceptable behaviour. Coming to 
the UK is a privilege not a right and we are not willing to allow entry to those whose presence is not 
conducive to the public good. The use of exclusion powers is very serious and no decision is taken 
lightly or as a method of stopping open debate.‘‖). 
  J.D. (2012), Washington University School of Law. Catherine Blue Holmes received her 
B.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley and her M.A. in Communications 
from Johns Hopkins University. She thanks her husband, Ryan, and her parents, John and Betsy, for 
their love and support. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
